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FEDERAL TAXATION AND ECONOMIC STABILITY
THE significance of the federal taxing power may no longer be measured
primarily in terms of its revenue function.' Prior to the last fifteen years per-
1. The principle that taxes may be justified under the federal taxing power only if
their primary purpose is the production of revenue has been invoked on several occasions
to invalidate legislation. If some other purpose is found primarily responsible for the
imposition of a particular federal tax, and if that purpose is beyond the power of Congress
to effectuate per se, the tax is unconstitutional. E.g., Child Labor Tan Case, 259 U.S.
20 (1922) (tax upon persons employing children under sixteen years of age in industries
outside the purview of interstate commerce) ; United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287
(1935) (excise tax upon occupation of engaging in liquor business within states in viola-
tion of state law) ; United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (tax upon processors of
basic agricultural commodities).
If, however, an activity taxed falls under permissible Congressional regulation, tax
measures have been sustained even though their revenue function has been unquestionably
subordinate to their effectiveness as control devices. See Mulford v. Smith, 307 U.S. 38
(1939) (sustaining the validity of a penalty provision in the Agricultural Adjustment Act
of 1938, applicable to the market price of all tobacco sold by a farmer in excess of his
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haps, the economic impact of taxes imposed to balance the federal budget"
could be regarded as incidental. Only a small proportion of the nation's in-
come passed through the federal treasury in the form of tax receipts and ex-
quota) ; Wickard v. Fillburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (extending the penalty upon "farm
marketing excess" under the Agricultural Adjustment Act to wheat). In Sunshine
Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 393 (1940) (approving a tax on the sale
price of bituminous coal exempting producer members of the code established by the
Bituminous Coal Commission), Mr. Justice Douglas emphasized that "this tax is not
designed merely for revenue purposes. In purpose and effect it is primarily a sanction
to enforce the regulatory provisions of the [Bituminous Coal] Act [of 1937]. But that
does not mean that the statute is invalid and the tax unenforceable. Congress may impose
penalties in aid of the exercise of any of its enumerated powers. The power of taxation,
granted to Congress by the Constitution, may be utilized as a sanction for the exercise of
another power which is granted it."
But cf. Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506 (1937) (upholding all annual license
tax on dealers in firearms, the Court refusing to look into possible regulatory motives in
the imposition of the tax as long as it produced even the most negligible revenue). For
a discussion of the constitutionality of taxation for non-fiscal purposes, see TwEwra'ru-
CENTURY FUND, FACING THE TAX PROBLEM 135 et seq. (1937).
In early theoretical disputes over the purpose of taxes two general viewpoints have
prevailed. Exponents who have favored the revenue function alone have looked upon taxes
only as devices for supporting the fisc on the ground that administrative difficultieg make
taxation an unreliable mechanism for accomplishing more ambitious purposes. For the
best recognized statement of this doctrine, see BASTABLE, PUBLIC FINANCE (3d ed. 1903).
Dissatisfied with such a limited concept, especially since the growth of national economics
in the past century, other economists have considered taxes as possible means of ac-
complishing deliberate economic changes for socially beneficial ends. Under this philoso-
phy, taxes have been extolled principally as instruments for redistributing the wealth or
income of a nation to promote social equality. For the formulation of these "socio-politi-
cal principles" of taxation, see WAGNER, FINANZWISSENSCHAFr (1877). For more recent
consideration of the "revenue vs. economic purpose" dichotomy, see MARsH, TAXATION
WITHOUT TxAs? 2 et seq. (1945); NEWCOMER, TAXATION AND FISCAL POLICY 32
(1940) ; PEcK, TAXATION AND WELFARE C. xi (1925); Cushman, Social and Economic
Control Through Federal Taxation, 18 MINN. L. REV. 759 (1934); Gray, Income Tax
Deductions as a Means of Effectuating Governmental Policies, 2 WASH. & LEY L. RV.
191 (1941); Shultz, Regulatory Taxes, 17 TAXES 515 (1939); and articles cited in
GRiswOLD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL TAXATION 50, n.5 (2d ed. 1946).
2. Customs duties, excises and income taxes were the principal taxes levied for
this purpose. The first tariff act [1 STAT. 24 (1789)] was designed primarily for revenue,
and this policy was continued until 1816. Since 1816, however, the tariff, in addition to
producing income, has been used also as a weapon to promote American business by
guaranteeing domestic markets free from foreign competition. See FAINSOD AND GonoN,
GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 85-93 (1941) ;TwENTIETH C.NTURY FUND,
op. cit. supra note 1, at 141 et seq.; Faulkner, The Dcvelopmcut of the American System,
141 ANNALS 11 (1929). See, generally, BmwELL, TARIFF POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES
(1933); JAMES, INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION AND TARIFFS (TNEC Monograph 10,
1941) ; TAUssiG, THE TARIFF HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (1896). For a summary
breakdown of federal revenue receipts disclosing the substantial reliance on customs duties
as a source of federal revenue during the nineteenth century, and their diminishing im-
portance more recently, see SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, ANNUAL REPORT 366, 368
(1946).
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penditures.3 But the burgeoning of a currently estimated national debt of
$259,000,000,000,4 precipitated by depression recovery measuress and spurred
Excises were the first internal revenue taxes levied in the United States. 1 STAT. 199
(1791) (tax on distilled spirits and stills to provide revenue for debt charges). Since
1865, excises have been resorted to in large number, principally as var revenue measures.
30 STAT. 448-70 (1898) (Spanish-American War) ; 40 STAT. 300, 303-24 (1917) (World
War I); 55 STAT. 706 (1941), as amended, 58 STAT. 61 (1944), 26 U.S.C. § 1650 (Supp.
1946) (World War II). See JOINT CommrrrEE o- INcu.AL RErvEzuE TAXATIotZ, Co0-
FICATioN OF INTERNAL REVENUE LAWS Xi (1938); Brauer, Excises in 5 ExvcY. Soc.
ScL 669 (1931). For the proportion of revenue receipts furnished by internal revenue
taxes during the nineteenth century, see DwEv~y, FINANCIAL HIsTrOR OF THE Mir=
STATEs 110, 142, 299, 399,426,475 (1909).
The income tax first appeared as a source of federal revenue in 1861, 12 StAT. 309
(1861) (3% levy on all United States residents with net income above S00), as amended,
12 STAT. 473 (1862), 13 STAT. 281 (1864), 16 STAT. 257 (1870) ; and during the decade of
its existence yielded nearly 259o of the total internal revenue. See KIMux, FEDmRAL Iz0cosn
TAxATION 4 (1929) ; PATTERSON AND SCHOLz, Eco0, oIc Prox..s OF MODEM: LIFE 325
(1937). Not until the Revenue Act of 1913, 38 STAT. 166 (1913), passed immediately fol-
lowing ratification of the 16th Amendment, did the income tax again assume importance as
a source of federal revenue. Since then it has produced an increasing share of total revenue
receipts. For one example of proportions in recent years, see note 47 infra.
3. Compare federal expenditures and tax revenue with figures for national income
from 1909, date of the first Department of Commerce income estimates, through 1946:
National Federal % of National Fedcral Tax % of National
Income Expenditures Inzcomne Revenues Income
(Billions of Dollars)
1909 28.7 .7 2.44 0.5 1.74
1915 37.0 .7 1.89 0.6 1.62
1921 51.7 5.0 9.67 4.9 9.48
1927 75.9 2.7 3.56 3.3 4.35
1933 39.6 4.6 11.62 1.8 4.55
1937 73.6 7.8 10.60 4.8 6.52
1941 81.3 13.9 17.10 6.9 8.49
1943 103.8 80.0 77.06 21.1 20.31
1945 168.3 98.4 58.47 41.0 24.36
1946 1782 60.8 34.12 36.2 20.31
NATioNAL INDusTRIAL CoNFERENzE BoARD, THE Ecoxomlc ALmANA c roa 1946-47 (1946)
49 (national income figures, 1909-27), 286 (federal expenditures, 1913-46), 287 (federal
tax revenues, 1916-46) ; SEcRETARY OF TUE TRE.Asunr, ANNUAL r .wor 363-9 (1946)
(federal expenditures and tax revenue before 1913 and 1916, respectively) ; UxNu;rr STA ES
DEP'T OF CoMRncE, SURVEY OF CU RENT BusixEss 14 (National Income Supp. July,
1947) (national income figures, 1929-46).
4. For significant points in the accelerated growth of the national debt during the
last three decades, see 93 Cong. Rec. 10788 (Nov. 20, 1947). For more detailed chrono-
logical data since 1919, compiled from Treasury Department Reports, see 93 Cong. Rec.
A4375 (Aug. 15, 1947).
5. For a breakdown of federal expenditures during the thirties, see SzccnsAn- oF
THE TRFASuRY, ANNUAL REPoar 454 (1941). On the recovery program of the Roosevelt
administration, see BUEHLE , PU BLIc FINANCE 65-71 (1936); HANSL, YEAnS OF PLUN-
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by war expenditures,6 has been accompanied by an enormous expansion in
both the incidence and degree of taxation. A taxing power so extensively
exercised, economists agree, exerts in fact far-reaching economic effects upon
business conditions. 7 And with the establishment in 1939 of the Division of
Tax Research of the Treasury Department to investigate the economic aspects
of federal taxes as a basis for legislative recommendations, 8 the position of
modern economists has received official recognition.
Once a taxation theory of "economic neutrality" is discarded, it is ap-
parent that taxes must either be consciously directed toward "economic con-
sistency"'10 or be permitted to modify the national economy at haphazard. By
the Employment Act of 1946,11 pledging the Federal Government "to promote
maximum employment, production, and purchasing power," "in a manner
calculated to foster and promote free competitive enterprise, '12 Congress
DER 296-303 (1935); SHULTZ AND CAINE, FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF THIE UNITED
STATES cc. xxviii, xxix (1937) ; WILMERDING, THE SPENDING POWER 180-95 (1943).
6. See SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, ANNUAL REPORT 370-1 (1946).
7. Shultz, Regulatory Taxes, 17 TAXES 515, 517 (1939), epitomizes the modern
economist's point of view: "A pure tax, one that produces revenue without in any way
altering the economic order, is a figment of the fiscal theorists' imagination." For dis-
cussions of economic aspects in taxation, see ANDERSON, TAXATION, RECOVERY, AND DE-
FENSE 24-37 (TNEC Monograph 20, 1941); DALTON, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC Fi-
NANCE, CC. X, xI, xII (1946) ; GRoVES, PRODUCTION, JoBs AND TAXES 9-10 (1944) ; MAusu,
op. cit. supra note 1, at 3-4; STAMP, THE FUNDAMIENTAL PRINCIPLES oF TAXATION C. V
(1936) ; Coln, Tax Policy and Capital Formation in NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFErENCE
BOARD, CAPITAL FORMATION AND ITS ELEMENTS 73 et seq. (1939) ; Goldenweiser, Jobs in
BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, JOBS, PRODUCTION, AND LIVING
STANDARDS 1 (Postwar Economic Studies No. 1, 1945).
8. Upon request, the Division of Tax Research provides information on aspects of
taxation and tax policy for the use of the House Ways and Means Committee, the Senate
Committee on Finance, the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, and federal
administrative and executive agencies. See Graske, Revising Tax Laws, 25 TAXES 205
(1947).
9. For the coinage of this term, see Cohm, supra note 7; Cohm, Conflicting Theories
of Corporate Income Taxation, 7 LAW & CONTEMP. PROD. 281, 288 (1940).
10. Ibid.
11. 60 STAT. 23-5 (1946), as amended, 60 STAT. 838 (1946), 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1021-4
(Supp. 1947).
12. 60 STAT. 23 (1946), 15 U.S.C.A. § 1021 (Supp. 1947). The Senate bill sponsored
by Senator Murray declared the Government responsible to assure continuing full cm-
ployment. S. 380, 91 CoNG. REc. 8880 (1945). But the House amendment tempered this
responsibility only to the promotion of employment, production and purchasing power, on
the theory that industry, agriculture and labor have joint obligations in removing the
causes of unemployment. 91 CONG. R c. 12095 (1945). The conference committee, which
resolved the Act as finally passed, adopted substantially the view of the House, indicating
in its report that "maximum", rather than "full", employment was to be the objective of
cooperation among the Federal Government, "industry, agriculture, labor, (and] State and
local governments." H. R. REP. No. 1520, 79th Cong., 2d. Sess. (1946).
Compare the White Paper on Employment Policy issued by the Churchill administra-
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seems inferentially at least to have committed itself to an economically-di-
rected tax policy.1 3 For taxation, with its demonstrated effect upon business
conditions, and thus upon any program for achieving maximum employment 14
and production, 15 is already a responsibility of government. And the indirect
government control exerted by taxation does not remove from private man-
agement the determination of specific employment, production, marketing and
price policies.' 6 An economically oriented tax system is thus consistent with
the free competition and occupational choice contemplated by the Act.17
Accordingly, a study of the economic aspects of taxation and corresponding
modifications in the present federal tax system would seem to be an essential
part of a program effectuating the Congressionally declared national eco-
nomic policy.
tion in England in May, 1944, declaring that "The Government accept as one of their
primary aims and responsibilities the maintenance of a high and stable level of employ-
ment after the war." See HANSEN, ECONOMIC POLICY AND FULL EMPLOYM1IENT 57 ci scq.
(1947).
13. The Act itself has been interpreted as contemplating the use, inlcr alia, of taxation,
banking credit and currency, foreign trade, public works and loans as "practicable means"
of implementing its policy. H. R. REP. No. 1520, supra note 12; 92 CoNG. REc. 935 (1946)
(remarks of Representative Whittington).
14. Even under conditions of maximum employment, seasonal, transitional and tech-
nological unemployment would result in an idle labor force estimated at 2% to 3 million
out of 60 million. HANSEN, EcoNomrc POLICY AND FULL EMPLOy&EN;T 10S (1947);
MORGAN, IN cME AND EMPLOYMENT 80 (1947).
15. "Maximum production", as urged in the Employment Act of 1946, has been
defined as "that volume of production which the people of a country when given oppor-
tunity to apply their labor whenever they see fit and under efficient conditions of employ-
ment, will want to turn out before they prefer to turn their time to the enjoyment of
leisure." Over a long period of years such a volume contemplates development and con-
servation of natural resources, adequate capital equipment, programs of job placement
and labor training, and constantly improved technological processes. 2 Coucm. or Eco-
NoMIc ADvisERS, ANNUAL REPORT TO THE PRESIrNT 8 (1947).
16. Contrast the freedom of management permitted by federal tax measures with the
direct intervention of government in enterprise illustrated by the National Industrial Re-
covery Act 48 STAT. 195 (1933), as amended, 48 STAT. 1183 (1934), 49 STAT. 375 (1935) ;
the Emergency Price Control Act, 56 STAT. 23-37 (1942), 50 U.S.C. Arp. §§ 901-24 (Supp.
1946) ; and the progeny of federal economic agencies created under the War Powers Acts,
55 STAT. 838 (1941), 56 STAT. 176 (1942), 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 601-22, 631-45a (Supp.
1946).
17. According to the Council of Economic Advisers, the Government accepted in
the Employment Act of 1946 only "a complementary role in areas where, or in times
when, private enterprise fails to provide adequate productive use of the Nation's re-
sources.' 2 CoUzctL OF EcoNomic ADviSERs, ANNUAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDSNT 25
(1947). See also 1 id. 14 (1946); HANSEN, EcoNomic Pron!.Ems OF Tn Pos -WAn
WORLD 9 et seq. (1942) ; TWENTETH CENTURY FUN-D, op. cit. stpra note 1, at 129-31;
Blakey, Postwar Fiscal Policy, 24 TAXES 574, 575 (1946); Musgrave, Fiscal Policy,
Stability, and Full Employment in BOARD OF GovFmwos OF THE FEDR AL REsErvC SYs-
TEm, PUBLIC FINANCE AND FULL EMrLOY ENT 1 (Postwar Economic Studies No. 3,
1945).
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THE IMPACT OF TAXES UPON THE BUSINESS CYCLE
In the current postwar period of record employment' s and production, 0
the immediate problem faced by any program designed to implement the na-
tional economic policy is to forestall substantial changes in prevailing economic
conditions. It follows that the major objective of such a program today is
minimization of the "business cycle." 20  The role assigned enlightened tax
administration, then, would seem to be a share of responsibility in averting, in
one instance, the idle production facilities, inactive labor forces, and low
standards of living characteristic of depression periods; and, in another, the
social disorders attendant upon unbridled inflation.21
Analysis of the impact of taxes upon the business cycle is facilitated by
18. In June, 1947, civilian employment reached a record peak of more than 60 million.
Unemployment averaged only 2.1 million for the entire year, thereby reaching "what is
probably the practical minimum" for peacetime. THE ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PPrsI-
DENT 2, 11-12 (Jan. 14 ,1948).
19. Total production in 1947 increased over that in 1946 and was greater than that in
any other peacetime year. THE ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 2, 11 (Jan. 14, 1948)'
Production during 1946 was 507 above that in 1939 and only 15% below the wartime maxi-
mum. THE ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 1 (1947).
20. Business cycles are usually defined as recurrences at irregular intervals of broad
fluctuations in general economic activities. ANGELL, INVESTMENT AND BUSINEss CYcLES
3 (1941); ESTEY, BUSINESS CYCLES 76 (1942); MITCHELL, BUSINESS CYCLES; THE
PRO3LEM AND ITS SETrING 468 (1928) ; Schumpeter, The Analysis of Economic Change,
17 REV. OF ECON. STATISTICS 2 (May, 1935).
For detailed descriptions of the various phases of the cycle (depression, revival,
prosperity and recession), see HANSEN, FISCAL POLICY AND BUSINESS CYCLES C. I
(1941) ; MITCHELL, BUSINESS CYCLES 5 et seq. (1913) ; VILLARD, DEFICIT SPENDING AND
THE NATIONAL INCOME 50 ct seq. (1941). Compare an unorthodox view refuting prevalent
cyclical theories in Fisher, Our Unstable Dollar and the So-Called Business Cycle, 20
J. Am. STATISTICS ASS'N 191, 192 (1925). An illuminating graphical presentation of the
cyclical patterns in American business from 1790 to 1945 is contained in BORSODI, INFLA-
TION IS COMING 20-3 (1945).
Popular references have been made to the assignment given to the Council of Eco-
nomic Advisers by the Employment Act of 1946 as the job of "taming the business cycle".
The Council itself has declared that the Act was aimed at moderating the calamities of
business depression. 1 CouNcIL OF ECONOmic ADVISERS, ANNUAL RErOI1.T TO THE PRESI-
DENT 9 (1946).
21. The threat of inflation may be more immediate today than the danger of reces-
sion. See THE ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 34-44 (Jan. 14, 1948). Since the
end of World War II, prices have exhibited a marked inflationary trend: From August
1945 to July 1947, for example, the national purchasing power index based on changes
in consumer prices decreased from 93.8 to 79.1. NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE
BOARD, THE ECONOMIC ALMANAC FOR 1948 52 (1947). The most graphic examples of the
havoc inflation can wreak upon business and social organization are recorded in the critical
conditions prevailing in Europe following World War I. See DULLE, THE DOLLAR, TnlE
FRANC AND INFLATION 51 et seq. (1933) (social structure of France); LANDIS, AN
ENGINEER LooxS AT INFLATION (1934) (general business conditions in Germany and
France) ; ROGERS, THE PROCESS OF INFLATION IN FRANCE, 1914-1927 (1929) (financial
system of France); WRIGHT, INFLATION AND AFTER (1934) (personal security Institu-
tions in France, Germany and Austria).
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separating the aggregate economic process into three components: national
product, n~ion-al iiwonw and notional spending. National product is cus-
tomarily defined as the market value of the economic goods and services pro-
duced in a designated fiscal period. The term includes both consumption
goods and services and investment goods; more specifically, it indicates the
natural resources developed, the goods manufactured and the many services
rendered in carrying on commerce.22  National income, on the other hand,
comprises the total payments for factor costs of current output. This con-
cept measures, for example, the aggregate payments for raw materials, wages
and salaries, rents, interest and profits.2 National product and national in-
come, therefore, represent the obverse sides of the production process-value
and ,cost.24
As monetary equivalents of "production" and "purchasing power", national
product and notional inconw constitute useful indices of the nation's progress
toward two of the three objectives of the Employment Act of 1946. Barring
a change in the value of money itself, the promotion of "maximum produc-
tion" and "purchasing power" may then be recast as the promotion of max-
22. Whether activities are "economic" so as to be included within the concept of
national product presents many controversial problems. Official appraisals made by the
Department of Commerce, for instance, exclude as unproductive government interest,
family services and illegal operations, but include services in ind such as the rental value of
homes occupied by owners and banking facilities provided without specific charge. UNmnm
STATEs DEP'T oF ComMRcE, op. cit. mupra note 3, at 2-3. For variations in the categoriza-
tion of activities embraced within the national product concept, see Kuz:.,ms, NATIO:.AL
INCOME AND ITS CoMPosmoN, 1919-1938 c. 1 (National Bureau of Economic Research,
1941) ; MoORGAN, op. cit. supra note 14, at 4-5.
Further difficulties arise from the expression of national product in gross or net
terms. Although the gross figure can be determined with greater statistical accuracy,
net national product remaining after the elimination of capital e.x musted in production
indicates more clearly the increase in real product added by current output. HA:ssx;,
EcONomic PoLIcy AND FuLL EMPLo'MENT 32 (1947); Kuz=crs, NATIN AL I,.co-E-
A SuMMARY or FINDINGS 112 (1946); Unrn7D STATES DEPT or Cosnsrnc, op. cit. supra
note 3, at 8, 10-11.
23. HANSEN, EcoNomic PoLicy AND FuLL EMPLOY=EN 37 (1947) ; Umm STATs
DEFT OF CoMMc CE, op. cit. mspra note 3, at 8. Total disposable income should be dis-
tinguished from the concept of national income. The former includes transfer payments
which do not arise out of productive services (such as veterans' allowances, pensions,
relief and social insurance payments) and excludes certain deductions from income arising
out of productive services (such as contributions to social insurance funds, corporate in-
come and excess profits taxes, and corporate net savings). The latter, however, has been
descriptively limited to incomes "created" by suppliers of production factors. MorGANZ., op.
cit. supra note 14, at 5-9.
24. Since net national product is expressed in market value and net national income in
factor costs (Which include interest and profits but not taxes), statistical measurements of
these components differ approximately by the indirect taxes paid by business. HANsMI,
EcoN-oMIc PoLIcY AwD FuL.. EmLOYmNT 37 (1947). For statistically-documented dis-
cussions of the relationship between national product (gross and net) and national income,
see ibid.; foRGAN, op. cit. supra note 14, at 15; UNrrED STATES DE PT or CoiMM nc op.
cit. supra note 3, at 10, 20.
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imum product and income. And realization of these objectives presupposes
maximum employment and optimum use of labor, resources and technological
skill. At the same time, a gradual increase in product and income, resulting
from the gradual perfection in production techniques and the more efficient
allocation of resources, can be expected even at a maximum level of employ-
ment.25  Hence the composite goal of the Employment Act may be resolved
as the attainment of expanding product and income without a rise in prices and
corresponding decline in monetary values.
National income is either consumed, saved or paid to the government in
taxes.26 Consumption expenditures represent private spending for consumer
goods and services, 27 leaving savings as the residuum of income neither spent
on consumption nor transferred in the form of taxes. The amount of con-
sumption expenditures in any income period depends upon the propensity to
consume which can be translated effectively into purchases. 28  Savings pro-
vides the primary source of investment expenditures, or private spending for
goods to be utilized in further production- But since the amount of invest-
ment expenditures in any income period depends upon the over-all attractive-
ness of risk-taking rather than merely the supply of savings,30 these expendi-
25. The gross national product adjusted for price changes has been estimated in the
past to increase at the rate of 5% per year. Bean, Postwar Output its the United States at
Full Employment, 27 REv. OF Ecox. STATrsTIcs 202 (1945). Since these estimates
have been based on periods when maximum employment did not always prevail, however,
perhaps the percentage increase would be smaller if present employment could be con-
tinued.
26. Taxes are sometimes classified as savings, since they are not consumption expendi-
tures. KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT INTEREST AND MONEY 61 (1936) ;
MORGAN, op. cit. supra note 14, at 18-20; ROBINSON, INTRODUCTION TO TIIE TnoRY OF
EMPLOYMENT 8-9 (1937). Cf. Pxiou, INcoME 6 (1946).
27. Consumer goods include "marketable goods and services desired for their own
sake aiid not merely as means to producing other goods and services." BEVELiUDO, FULL
EMPLOYMENT IN A FREE SocIEry 132 (1945). See also KEYNES, GENERAL THEORY OF EM-
PLOYMENT INTEREST AND MONEY 61 (1936) ; MORGAN, Op. cit. supra note 14, at 16; ViL-
LARD, op. cit. supra note 20, at 16.
28. For an analysis of the objective and subjective factors determining whqther indi-
viduals spend or save their income, see KEYNES, GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT IN-
TEREST AND MONEY cc. 8, 9 (1936). Studies of national income changes have disclosed
that consumption expenditures generally are a more stable factor than savings, i.e., at
higher levels of income, proportionately more is saved and less is consumed. Ezekiel,
Saving, Coimsnption and Investment: 1, 32 Amx. ECON. REv. 22, 49 (1942).
29. Investment expenditures have been described as "a form of outlay directed not to
goods or services desired for their own sake (for immediate enjoyment), but to goods and
services desired as the means to producing other goods and services," e.g., spending for
manufacturing plants and equipment, transportation facilities, and materials to be used in
production. BEVERIDGE, op. cit. supra note 27, at 405. Investment expenditures thus denote
purchases of producers' and consumers' capital goods, as distinguished from the popular
notion of monetary investment-the purchase of stocks and bonds which may not lead to
any increase in production of goods and services. MORGAN, Op. cit. supra note 14, at 101.
30. The "attractiveness of risk-taking" to individuals is composed both of expected
profits and of the human satisfaction which entrepreneurs derive from the development of
1236 [Vol.57: 1229
1948] FEDERAL TAXATION AND ECONOMIC STABILITY 1237
tures in one period may be either greater or less than savings in the previous
period if, in one instance, they are made from borrowed funds in excess of
savings or if, in another instance, savings are not fully utilized. Gonmunen
expenditures may be likened to either consumption expenditures or invest-
ment expenditures according to the kind of goods or services purchased with
public funds.3' Consumption and investmwnt, as distinguished from consump-
tion expenditures and investment expenditures, constitute the value of national
product consumed and not consumed immediately.
Since income today originates in yesterday's spending, the business cycle is
predominantly a phenomenon of the spending process.32 Modern economists
associate recessional and inflationary trends with changes in the flow of in-
come into consumption, savings and tax channels and in the disposition of this
income within each channel by consumers, investors and government.33 Though
the emphasis of such explanations may differ, all seem to proceed from the
same pattern of reasoning. Given a national income and product in year one,
this income and product may either rise or fall in year two depending upon the
total amount of consumption expenditures, investment expenditures and gov-
ernment expenditures in the second period. National income and product,
therefore, vary with changes in consumption expenditures from one period
to another, -with changes in the relation of investment expenditures to savings
of the preceding period, and with changes in the relation of government ex-
penditures to tax revenues of the preceding period. Deflation, a fall in income,
is the result of spending less than the national income for combined consump-
tion, investment and government projects. 3 4 Inflation, a rise in income, con-
business. See KEYNEs, GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT INTEREST AND MONEY 150
(1936). The level of total investment, on the other hand, is affected by such societal
factors as growth of new industries, growth and shifting of populations, changes in pro-
ductivity and price levels, unbalanced cost-price relationships and many special causes.
ALTMAN, SAVING INVESTMNT, AND NATIONAL INcOmE 92 et seq. (TNEC Monograph
37, 1941).
31. See MORGAN, op. cit. mpra note 14, at 18-19; Lindeman, Income Mcasurenent as
Affected by Govenment Operations, 6 S-ruDEs IN INCOME AND WEALTH 3 (1943).
32. Other explanations of the causes of business cycles have included the weather,
crop changes, wars, inventions, spontaneous changes in taste, banking policy, and psycho-
logical periods of optimism and pessimism. For classifications of the diverse theories of
cyclical sources, see H.ABERLER, PROSPERITY AD,1 DEI'Essio. 5-12, 133-0 (193) ; MIrC U-
Eri, BusiNEss CYcLEs: THE PROBLEM AND ITs SE-rrING 50-3 (192).
33. Economic views on the causes of cyclical "crises" in business fall into three
groups: (1) the undersaving-overinvestment theory; (2) the oversaving-underinvestment
theory; (3) the oversaving-underconsumption theory. See EsIEY, Busin.Ess CYcLEs 261
(1942) ; H.ABER.z, op. cit. supra note 32, at 2 et seq., 111 et seq.; I YEs, SPEN,-DING, SAV-
ING AND EMPLOYMENT 196 (1945); KLEIN, THE KEY EsAN REvoLUrrTio 134 ct scq.
(1947) ; ,frrCHELL, BUSINESS CYcLEs: THE PRoL.EM AND ITS SErTTIN 25 (1928) ; Vu.-
LARD, op. cit. supra note 20, at 57 et seq. For statistical studies of the functional relations
among national income, savings and investment see ALTmxN, op. cit. supra note 30; Ezek-
iel, Statistical Investigations of Saving, Con.uisption, and InAvstncnt: 1, 32 Am. Eco.;.
REV. 22 (1942) ; Abramovitz, Savings and Investment: Profits vs. Prospcrity?, 32 Am.
EcoN. REv. 53 (TNEC Supp. 1942).
34. See ALTMAN, op. cit. mpra note 30, at 4; WERN Tr, THE CoN-rOL OF BusZ.sS
CYCLES 64 (1940).
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versely, is the result of spending in excess of current national income. This
excess of spending may itself result from the creation of new money or
credit, the release or purchasing power accumulated from prior periods, or
an unusually rapid turnover of funds.85 To the extent that current produc-
tion can be sufficiently expanded to absorb the demand, prices of the prior
period need not rise; beyond that point inflation must be reflected in an in-
creasing cost of living. A variation in incentives to private consumption and
investment expenditures, then, would seem to be the office of any economic de-
vice seeking reduction of cyclical fluctuations.
The choice between promoting consumption or investment involves basically
the problem of how best to promote the economic progress of the nation. Since
a rising standard of living requires the improvement of means of production
and allocation of resources, rather than total consumption of current produc-
tion, incentives to either investment expenditures or consumption expendi-
tures must be addressed to maintaining the rate of capital growth which the
society as a whole can accept as an optimum-a rate which does not, on the
one hand, impose unduly burdensome restrictions on consumption, nor, on the
other, materially slow down the rate of increase in real incomes.
But a long range solution to the problem of raising the standard of living
is not inconsistent with, and may depend upon, an answer to the problem of
cyclical control. Compensatory government fiscal policy has been the device
most frequently suggested for the latter role.30 More specifically, variation in
government expenditures alone, tax revenue remaining constant or varying less
than expenditures, has been prescribed to offset underspending and overspend-
ing by private consumers and investors. Because of the predominance of de-
pression problems in American commercial history, this remedy has been in-
35. One of the primary factors responsible for the present inflationary trend in busi-
ness has been the tendency to "dishoard" some $10 billion of money issued during the war
in excess of the national needs for actual circulating media. See KurnT, PRIcES AND
BUSINESS in 1947 11 et seq. (1946). In March, 1947, the volume of money in circulation
was estimated to be 75% of the total income, as compared with a usual ratio of less than
50%. Burgess, National Debt, Interest Rates and the Saver, Commercial and Finan-
cial Chronicle, March 13, 1947, § 1, p. 1374, col. 2-4.
36. The doctrine of government compensatory fiscal policy to combat cyclical unem-
ployment takes its origin from the writings of Keynes. Keynes pointed out that control of
an economy predicated on the laissez-faire theory that aberrational economic forces are
automatically brought into line by the operation of the interest rate and the price mecha-
nism has proved to be historically inadequate to forestall periods of extremes in business--
either depressions or boom eras. To achieve an equilibrium among economic forces at a
level of maximum employment, he proposed to supplement laissez-faire by government in-
tervention in the economy in the form of 1) government spending; 2) control of the rate of
interest; 3) and reduction in the inequality of incomes. KEYNES, THE END OF LAIssgZ-
FAiRE (1926); KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT INTEREST AND MONEY
(1936) ; HAYES, op. cit. supra note 33, at 133 et seq.
For general discussions of the use of compensatory fiscal policy, see ANDERSON, op.
cit. snpra note 7, at 27; HANSEN, ECONOMIC POLICY AND FULL EMPILOYMENT 11, 110
(1947) ; MARSH, op. cit. supra note 1, at 18; Blakey, Tax Problems of the National Gov.
enzinent, 25 TAXES 320, 323 et seq. (1947) ; Colim, Fiscal Policy, 2 TAX L. Rzv. 1 (1946).
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yoked only to compensate for deficiencies in private spending, as in the "pump
priming" era of deficit financing during the 1930's.3r Although dissent has been
voiced, there is considerable evidence that these measures, by increasing both
consumption expenditures and investment expenditures, have been at least in
part responsible for recovery from recession.3s And returning less to the na-
37. The federal works projects and emergency relief which flourished from 1935-1939
constituted a modified form of pump priming, inducing a sharp rise in the purchase of con-
sumer goods. This rise, in turn, by increasing profit margins, tended to stimulate invest-
ment expenditures. ANDERSON, op. cit. supra note 7, at 13, 27; HANsm, FULL REcovany
OR STAGNATION? 276-7 (1938) ; Studenski, Economic Effect of New Deal Fiscal Policies,
19 TA ES 14, 17 (1941). Cf. Samuelson, The Theory of Pump-Priming Rcxamincd, 30
Am. EcoN. Rnv. 492, 504 et seq. (1940).
38. It is generally recognized that public spending from 1932-1937 was directly suc-
cessful in reducing unemployment and in increasing consumption e.xpenditures. GuL-=,
AN EcoNoMIc PRoGRAM FOR AmRICAN DEMocRAcY 24-5 (1938). By increasing consump-
tion expenditures, moreover, public spending secondarily furnished the impetus for sub-
stantial expansion of private investment expenditures to finance the production of con-
sumer goods. Ibid.; HANSEN, FULL REcovERY OR STAGNATION? 277 (1938); Vu.ltnrn, op.
cit. surpra note 20, at 359-60. As a result, national income rose rapidly from a low mark of
$41.7 billion in 1932 to $73.6 billion in 1937, considerably outstripping federal net income-
increasing expenditures for those years. UNImTD STATs Dm'r oF ComER, op. cit. srspra
note 3, at 14; Gayer, Fiscal Policies, 28 AM. EcoN. Rrv. 90, 97 et seq. (Supp. 1933) ;
Haley, The Federal Budget: Economic Consequences of Deficit Financing, 31 AU.. EcoN.
REv. 67, 69 (Pt. 2 1941).
Difference of opinion regarding the efficacy of deficit spending as a permanent re-
covery measure, however, arose out of the acute business recession in 1937. Some critics
claim that the success of deficit spending as an interim economic measure is to be deter-
mined by the extent to which private business can maintain higher levels of production, in-
come and employment when the "artificial" government stimulus is removed. Gnmu=Tr, op.
cit. supra, at 27; NEwcomER, op. cit. stpra note 1, at 75; Vz.LAR, op. cit. stipra note 20, at
365. To these observers, the crucial test of the federal spending program of the early
1930's came in late 1936 and 1937, when public expenditures were tapered in an effort to
balance the budget. LEAGUE OF NATIONS, WORLD ECONOMIC SURnyEY 1937-33, 21, 22
(1938) ; 131 THE EcoNoIsr 233 (1938). Accordingly, the sharp curtailment of economic
activities in 1937 indicated to them the failure of the compensatory fiscal policy previously
pursued. Private investment, they said, had not sufficiently rallied because of the imped-
ing effect of large public expenditures, and therefore whatever recovery had been ac-
complished was a "consumption recovery," which collapsed when the government ceased
to provide consumer funds. GnmERT, op. cit. 4upra, at 28; HANSEN, FULL R.Ec , y Oa
STAGNATION? 274, 281 (1938). Factually-supported dissents have been raised to this char-
acterization of the recovery on the theory that the deficiency in private investment develop-
ment was confined to long-term investment, such as permanent building and construction,
for short-term investment, such as inventories, rose rapidly immediately before 1937. FrL-
LNER, MONrARY POLICIES AND FULL EMPLOYMENT 35 (1946) ; Samuelson, stpra note 37.
But, regardless of the nature of the recovery, the contraction in investment which occurred
in 1937 and the consequent drop in national production, income and employment have been
attributed not as much to the shortcomings of deficit financing as to other forces, such as
the initial impact of several concurrent administration policies which temporarily counter-
acted the incentive to investment e-xpenditure-e.g., enactment of the undistributed profits
tax and regulatory laws for security markets. BUEHLER, THE U-DxsTnurn Pnorxrs
TAx 33-6 (1937) ; NEwcouER, op. cit. supra note 1, at 75; Hough, The 1937 Bord Mar-
ket. 136 BANKERS' MAGAZINE 60 (1938). If this explanation be true, deficit spending
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tional income stream through government expenditures than is drawn from
the stream in taxes would seem correlatively effective to restrain inflationary
movements.
3 9
Since government spending affects national spending merely to the extent
that it differs from revenue receipts, however, it is the accompanying tax
policy which resolves the net economic impact of government expenditures. 40
A -variation in federal tax receipts, and therefore in government borrowing,
may thus be utilized independently of federal expenditures to perform similar
countercyclical functions.41 Except in periods of severe financial distress when
tax relief per se may be insufficient to compensate for the diminished expecta-
tions of future profits from investment, tax changes may well be preferred to
a revision in expenditures. Urging business itself to dispel incipient reces-
should not be condemned as a poor counter-cyclical weapon because of the unfavorable
reaction of an investment market depressed by factors foreign to the spending program it-
self. For an exhaustive study of the causes and manifestations of the 1937 recession, see
the unpublished doctoral dissertation of Kenneth Roose, THE RECESSION AND REVIVAL OF
1937-1938, on file in the Yale University Library.
For general discussions of the economic utility of deficit financing, see GROvEs, POsT-
WAR TAXATION AND ECONOMIC PROGRES s 365 (1946); NICHOLS AND ROSKAM, PUrP-
PRIMING THEORY OF GOVERNMENT SPENDING (1939) ; VILLARD, op. cit. supra note 20, at
365 et seq.; Williams, Deficit Spending, 31 AM. EcoN. REV. 52 (Pt. 2 1941).
39. See THE ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 47-8 (Jan. 14, 1948). An excess
of revenue, if obtainable, would be applied against the national debt. A decrease in an in-
ternally-held national debt is purely a transfer transaction between taxpayers and bond-
holders. HANSEN, ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF THE POST WAR WORLD 38 (1942); HANSEN,
FISCAL POLICY AND BUSINESS CYCLES 140-4 (1941). Since the debt is held principally by
banks, other corporations and wealthier individuals, however, debt reduction can 'be de-
flationary. See SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, ANNUAL REPORT 60 (1946) (ownership of
federal securities by investor classes). For the quantity of money or credit issued by banks
decreases and the holders-of retired bonds have a greater tendency and ability to save than
do the general group of taxpayers from whom taxes are collected. See GROVES, POSTWAR
TAXATION AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS 358 (1946) ; MARsH, op. cit. sitpra note 1, at 78-0.
Cf. LuTz, PUBLIC FINANCE 632 (4th ed. 1947).
Recent suggestions have been made for curbing present inflationary trends by redtic-
ing government expenditures and retiring the public debt. HANSEN, ECONOMIC POLICY
AND FULL EMPLOYMENT 10 (1947) ; Hardy, Prospects of Inflation in the Transition Pe-
riod in BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, PRICES, WAGES AND EM-
PLOYMENT 27 (Postwar Economic Studies No. 4, 1946). But the likelihood of a federal
revenue surplus for debt retirement seems remote today in light of the Marshall Plan
Foreign Assistance Act of 1948, Pub. L. No.'472, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (April 3, 1948), and
increased national defense expenditures.
40. See NATIONAL RESOURCES PLANNING BOARD, THE ECONOMIC EFEcTs OF TIE
FEDERAL PUBLIC WORKS EXPENDITURES 1933-1938, 108, 112-5 (1940).
41. Tax adjustments intended to vary total private spending, as for example, to in-
crease either private investment or consumption expenditures without a corresponding
decrease in the other, can be accomplished only by varying total tax receipts. Unless the
adjustment is confined solely to changing the ratio between investment and consumption
expenditures, therefore, a variation in government borrowing is necessary. See GROVES,
POSTWAR TAXATION AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS 364 (1946) ; PAUL, TAXATION FOR PROS-
PERITY 345 et seq. (1947).
1240 [Vol. 57 : 1229
1948] FEDERAL TAXATION AND ECONOMIC STABILITY 1241
sions by freeing potential consumption and investment forces from tax bur-
dens would seem more "calculated to foster and promote free competitive en-
terprise" than government subsidies and public works. In like manner, with-
drawing inflationary sources of spending from consumers and investors would
seem preferable to government price ceilings as a means of checking a rise in
the cost of living.
There are limits, nevertheless, to a compensatory expenditure or tax pro-
gram. Since the "compensatory" feature of such a program lies in supple-
menting or counteracting national spending, rather than in balancing annual
deficits and surpluses,4 2 and since anti-depressional revenue deficits have in
fact considerably outweighed anti-inflationary or prosperity surpluses,43 the
long run usefulness of government fiscal policy seems to be circumscribed by
a practical limit of the public debt.4 4 Unless the interest payments on govern-
ment obligations can be 'met from current taxation, default or reduction of
the gold value of the currency may be necessary. 45 A countercyclical tax
42. A balanced annual budget is in itself a meaningless goal and clearly inconsistent
with a compensatory fiscal policy, since business cycles do not coincide with fiscal periods.
See Goldenweiser, supra note 7, at 16. But compare the dissent of Henry Hazlitt in Tu-
FULL EMPLOYMENT BILL-AN ANALYSIS 26 (American Enterprise Ass'n Problem No.
415, 1945) : "The only 'substitute' for the [Murray Full Employment] bill [based on the
premise of compensatory fiscal policy] ... would be an announcement by Congress of its
determination to bring the Federal budget into balance at the earliest practicable moment."
The first endorsement by Congressional leaders of unbalanced budgeting is contained
in an amendment to the Murray Full Employment Bill proposed by Senators Taft and
Radcliffe and unanimously passed by the Senate. By its terms, a federal spending pro-
gram to counteract depression was to be accompanied by taxation merely sufficient to fore-
close net increase in the debt over a "reasonable number of years." 91 CoNG. Rnc. 9144
(1945). The amendment, however, was not included in the Act as finally passed. See
HAxsEN, ECONOMIC POLICY AND FULL E' MPLOYMENT 113-4 (1947). For a good discussion
of the problems in a cyclical budget-balancing program, see GRovEs, PosrwAn TANATo:;
A.n EcoNoMIc PROGREsS 356 ct scq. (1946).
43. For the prominence of deficits among annual Treasury balances, see SsnrMm"
OF THE TREASURY, ANNUAL REPORT 366-71 (1946) (summary of annual operations, 17&9-
1946). Since 1900, for example, 27 of the 46 years have disclosed deficits consistently
larger than the surplus figures for remaining years.
44. The statutory limit of the national debt now stands at "275 billion. 60 STAT. 316
(1946), 31 U.S.C.A. § 757(b) (Supp. 1947) ; see SECRETARY OR THE TnmIsuny, A:-NUtaL
REPORT 66-7 (1946). The actual debt is currently estimated at $259 billion, note 4 supra.
45. That such are the alternatives to retirement of the public debt may be seen in the
experience of many European countries and the Confederate States following the Civil
War. GRovEs, FINANCING GOVERNMENT 555-6 (1945); LTz, Pun=c FINANcE 630 (4th
ed. 1947) ; NEwcoME., op. cit. .tpra note 1, at 76-8.
Short of the outside limit at which current taxation cannot meet interest payments,
there is little agreement among economists as to the permissible size of the public debt, al-
though the great majority seem to agree that this figure must be determined relative to
the size and distribution of the national income. GRovEs, FINANCING GovErNMENT 544
(1945) ; HANSEN, FISCAL POLICY AND BUSncESS CYCLES 168 et seq. (1941); NEwcomxxn,
op. cit. supra note 1, at 77. The basis of disagreement, where substantial, seems to be the
stand taken toward an increased direct participation by government in enterprise. N%,-
COMET, op. cit. supra note 1, at 76, 78-9. Experience in foreign countries has indicated that
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program of indefinite duration, therefore, must take into account not only the
net government contribution to national spending but also the net government
receipt of revenue so that the debt will always remain easily serviceable by
current taxation. 40
CYCLICAL ADAPTABILITY OF THE INCOME TAX
Assuning that some revision of the federal tax system to facilitate cyclical
control is desirable in the light of a declared national economic policy, it does
not seem necessary to utilize all federal taxes in such a program. Several
features qualify the income tax as best adapted for stimulating or curbing dis-
cordant consumption and investment tendencies. 47
Of primary importance is the automatic adjustability to cyclical needs which
income tax yields have displayed in the past-diminishing more perceptibly in
depression and increasing more heavily in prosperous years than other tax
yields.4 8 This elasticity of return accompanying fairly stable government ex-
a debt equal to twice the national income can be easily serviced by current taxation,
GRovs, POSTVAR TAXATION AND EcoNoMIc PROGRESS 359 (1946) ; HANSEN, ECONOMIC
PROBLEMS OF THE PosT-WA WORLD 36-7 (1942). Accordingly, if recent annual national
incomes of approximately $180 billion can be maintained, or increased, the debt might be
built up to at least $360 billion without alarm. NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE BOARD,
THE EcoNoMIc ALMANAC FOR 1948, 335 (1947).
46. Interest upon the outstanding federal debt is approximately 2% or $5 billion per
year. ABROT, MANAGEMENT OF THE FEDERAL DEBT 83 et seq. (1946) ; SECRETARY OF Tii
TREAsURY, ANNUAL REPORT 64 (1946). The burden of such charges is best seen, however,
by a comparison of interest with national income. MORGAN, op. Cit. supra note 14, at 236-7.
47. Federal estate and gift and social security taxes, tariffs, and excises are not con-
sidered essential to a countercyclical tax structure primarily because of the minimal impor-
tance of their yield relative to the income tax. In 1946, for example, the distribution of
revenue receipts by major sources was as follows:
Income taxes 69.8%




Total receipts T- .0 V
SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, ANNUAL REPORT 398-9 (1946).
48. Total Federal Income and Profits % of Total
Revenie Receipts Taxes Receipts
(Millions of Dollars)
1920 6695 3945 58.9
1925 3780 1761 46.6
1929 4033 2331 57.8
1932 2006 1057 52.7
1935 3800 1099 28.9
1938 5855 2640 45.1
1941 7607 3470 45.6
SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, ANNUAL REPORT 368-70 (1946). During the depression
of the 1930's, income tax rates were raised to the level of World War I. Yet the per-
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penditures approximates, in fact, deliberate compensatory action by the gov-
ernment. Furthermore, since the federal income tax applies to net income,
and thus does not add to costs of production;' 9 it exerts a less complex effect
on national spending than other taxes. The impact of these other taxes can
be determined only by tracing increased costs through the pricing process to
consumers and investors, whereas the impact of the income tax falls directly
on the consumption and investment expenditures of the corporation or indi-
vidual on whom it is levied.
What revision is necessary then to conform the federal income tax
system to a countercyclical program? Exactly what amendments can be de-
vised in combination with other countercyclical measures to maintain national
spending at a point consonant with maximum employment, production and
purchasing power? The answer, of course, must depend upon the effect of
particular elements in the personal and corporate income taxes on consumption
and investment expenditures.
The influence of the personal income tax upon total national spending is
primarily determined by the breadth of base, on the one hand, and the progres-
sion of surtax rate, on the other. The former, for instance, has been shown
statistically to coincide closely with national consumption expenditures because
of the concentration of potential purchasing power among consumers in the
lower income brackets.50 Increasing the supply of funds available to these con-
sumers by raising the normal tax exemption tends to increase consumption and
subsequent national income;51 conversely, decreasing the exemption would
tend to reduce excessive inflationary consumption expenditures.r2 A variation
centage of total federal tax receipts coming from income and profits taxes in each of
the years 1933-1936 was lower than in any year since 1917. TwrxTH CLNTnTmy Ful ,
op. cit. supra note 1, at 41-2.
49. Individual and corporate net income taxes apply only after profits have appeared.
Therefore, no cost accounting system can apportion an income tax to production before
net income has been calculated. ANDERSON, op. cit. supra note 7, at 179; Hxsm;,
EcoNomic PoaoBm s oF THE PosT-WAR WoD 20 (1942) ; Shultz, Economic Effects of
A Corporate income Tax, 21 TAxEs 598, 599 (1943). But see Musgrave, Federal Tax
Reform in BoARD OF Govanxoas OF THE FFDa.uL RESERV SYsTEMs, PuMac FzxIN cz
AND FuLL EmTPLOYmENT 22, 47 (Postwar Economic Studies No. 3, 1945).
50. In 1938-1939, for example, less than 105 of income was saved by income classes
up to 3000. The consumer income represented by these classes amounted to more than
$47 billion out of a total consumer income for all income classes of approximately $70
billion. CaL3I AND TARAsov, WHO PAYS THE TAxES? 6, 33 (TNEC Monograph 3, 1941);
MAsH, op. cit. supra note 1, at 53.
51. Compare the untried proposal for stimulating consumption expenditures by a per-
sonal tax on all income not spent on consumer goods. Musgrave, stpra note 49, at 25; it
cf. Fisher, A Fmidamnental Reason for Not Taxing Savings, 19 TAxEs 3 (1941).
52. Compare the suggestions of an anti-inflationary tax on consumer spending:
MAmsH, op. cit. supra note 1, at 67; Paul, The Inpact of Taxation ons Comnumer Spending,
21 TAXES 325 (1943); Weinstein, A Direct Tax on the Use of Surplus Purchasing
Power, 20 TAXES 525 (1942) ; of a "deferred pay-compulsory savings" program for %%age-
earners: KEYNEs, How To PAY FOR THE WAR (1940); and of a ta.N-refund plan for
personal income saved: Slichter, Tax Formula: For Savers, Lower Lcies, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 25, 1948, § 6, p. 13.
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
in consumption may, through the medium of profits, also affect the propen-
sity to invest in a later period. But, in the light of changing economic con-
ditions, any permanent alteration in the normal tax exemption would seem as
ineffective to accomplish cyclical control as none at all.
Just as breadth of the tax base corresponds to national consumption ex-
penditures, it would seem' that precipitousness of the surtax rate should bear
directly upon total investment expenditures. Indeed, this would be true if
the profits of investment were distributed to individuals upon whom the sur-
tax is levied. In recent years, however, individual stockholders have received
less than half of corporate profits after taxes,53 the undistributed portion
being reinvested by corporations and subjected, not to the high personal
surtax,5 but to the lower capital gains tax upon the profits realized when cor-
porate stock changes hands.55 Although section 102 of the Internal Revenue
Code is designed to close this loophole in the personal surtax by penalizing
an "unreasonable" accumulation of surplus,"0 it does not reach profits retained
for the needs of a business.57 Yet, to the extent the personal surtax is not
avoided, the progressive absorption of individual savings which it accom-











UNITED STATES DFP'T OF COMIMIERCE, op. cit. supra note 3, at 19 (Table 1). Although
this "conservative" dividend policy during the World War II years was caused partially
by the establishment of reserves in preparation for postwar reconversion costs, in the main
the undistributed profits constituted an accumulation of unearmarked surplus. See Der-
rickson, Trend of Corporate Profits 1929-45 in UNITED STATES DEP'T OF COMMRCE, SUR-
VEY OF CURRENT ]BuSINESS 9, 15-6 (April, 1946).
54. 25% is the maximum tax rate on capital gains. INT. REv. CODE § 117(a)-(c);
U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.117-3 (1943).
55. Rates on ordinary income of individuals increase progressively to 77% of net
income. INT. REV. CODE § 12, as amended by Pub. L. No. 471, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., § 101
(April 2, 1948).
56. See Rudick, Section 102 and Personal Holding Company Provisions of the Inter-
nal Reveme Code, 49 YALE L.J. 171 (1939).
57. For discussions of the problems of enforcement in § 102 of the Code, see Cary,
Accumulations Beyond the Reasonable Needs of the Business: The Dilemma of Section
102(c), 60 HARv. L. REv. 1282 (1947); Note, 57 YALE L.J. 474 (1948). A collateral
effect of § 102, combined with high personal surtax rates, may be to encourage corpora-
tions to make investment expenditures classifiable in the eyes of the Commissioner of In-
ternal Revenue as legitimate business expansion.
58. Since savings form a residuum in the higher income classes after consumption
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nificantly, the propensity to invest. For the willingness of private investors to
put their own savings into risk ventures and of entrepreneurs to "invest" their
personal endeavors and the savings of others59 in the productive process de-
pends at least in part upon the retainable profits accruing therefrom0 0 Hence
mitigation of tax rates upon middle and upper income groups, insofar as they
would apply to profits passed on to individual stockholders, would encourage
individual investment expenditures and effort and tend to increase the national
product and income. Or inflationary overspending by individuals for capital
goods could be discouraged by an increased surtax rate. In either case subse-
quent consumption would also be ultimately affected. Again, however, the
precise determination of a desirable and effective surtax rate must depend
upon the economic "state of the nation."
In addition to variations in base and rate, exemptions, deductions and spe-
cial rate provisions determining computation of the personal income tax may
affect the balance between consumption and investment expenditures. For
example, exclusion from gross income of federal pension allowances to veter-
ans61 and social security benefits 2 deduction from adjusted gross income of
state and local sales taxes,63 and perhaps deduction of a limited amount of
medical and dental expenses," principally affect consumption expenditures.
In like manner, the exemption of interest on state, municipal and certain out-
expenditures and taxes have been subtracted from income, changes in tax rates applying
to these incomes affect savings, and thus investment expenditures, more than consump-
tion expenditures. COLm AND TARAsov, op. cit. supra note 50, at 33.
59. Although a substantial amount of individual savings is directly invested, a
larger proportion is deposited in banks or paid to insurance companies and then finally
invested by entrepreneurial interests through these financial institutions. ALmxm:,
op. cit. supra note 30, at 4.
60. Heavy taxation of investment yields will cause many people to hold on to cash
balances in preference to sinking them in risky ventures. See Musgrave, Fcdcral Tax
Reform in BOARD OF Go-T0xoRS OF THE FFZFRAL RESERVZ SYSTrM, PLDLIC FN MAcN
AND FULL EMPLOYMENT 22, 31 (Postwar Economic Studies No. 3, 1945). An invest-
ment which is especially risky, but which may return gain sufficient to raise an individual's
taxable income several brackets, will be seriously discouraged by a high income tax.
Bronfenbrenner, Diminishing Returns in Federal Taxation, 50 J. PoL Eco:.. 699 (1942).
The "limit of taxation" is said to be reached when any further rise will deter the capitalist
from making extra efforts to produce in larger quantities or in a more efficient manner.
See MORGAN, op. cit. supra note 14, at 197; TWENTIETH CENTURY Fuzv, op. cit. supra
note 1, at 61; Editorial, 141 THE EcoNoMIST 411 (1941).
61. 49 STAT. 607 (1935), 38 U.S.C. §450 (1940) ; LT. 3739, 1945 Cum. bumL. 61;
IT. 3638, 1944 Ctr. BuLu. 67.
62. IT. 3447, 1941-1 Cum. BuuL. 191 ; I.T. 3229, 3230, 1938-2 Cum. BuLL 136; I.T.
3194, 1938-1 Cum. BuLL. 114.
63. INT. REV. CODE § 23 (c) (3).
64. INT. RaV. Core § 23(x), as amended by Pub. L. No. 471, 80th Cong., 2d Sess.
§304 (April 2, 1948).
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standing federal obligations,6 capital loss carry-over privileges,00 the family
income-splitting provisions of the Revenue Act of 194807 and probably most
important of all, the separate rates on capital gains05 are closely associable with
investment spending.
The thrust of "investor taxes" may be upon the composition as well as the
quantum of national investment. Thus, through favorable tax treatment of
interest earned from state and municipal bonds, savings may be channeled
from investmentlin private business to investment in government projects.00
The corporate income tax70 represents another device, with perhaps more
limited possibilities, 71 for controlling national spending. Since the present
tax cannot be shifted to the corporation's employees or consumers as a pro-
duction cost,72 despite occasional statements to the contrary,7 3 its major im-
pact in both base and rate seems to fall more on the side of savings than con-
sumption expenditures.74 For the profits of a corporation may be followed
finally either to the stockholder-saver who receives dividends reduced by the
amount of the corporate tax, or to the corporation itself which may retain
part of its earned surplus for capital expansion or reinvestment for its stock-
holders.
Through the various provisions governing its computation, the corporate in-
come tax may affect the quality as well as the quantity of investment expendi-
tures. Such provisions as loss carry-over privileges 70 and depreciation sched-
65. INT. REV. ConE § 22(b) (4) (interest on obligations of the United States issued
before March 1, 1941, if tax exempt by act authorizing issuance; and interest on not over
$5000 of United States Savings bonds, at cost, and Treasury bonds, at face value, issued
prior to March 1, 1941). This exemption applies to corporate as well as individual tax-
payers.
66. INT. REV. CODE § 117(e).
67. Pub. L. No. 471, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., § 301 (April 2, 1948). Computations pre-
pared by the Treasury Department prove, for example, that the decrease in tax liability
accomplished by dividing taxable income between husband and wife substantially bene-
fits only income classes above $5000 annually. DIVISION OF TAX RESEARCH, TRAsuRY
DEPARTMENT, THE TAX TREATMENT OF FAMILY INCOME Table 2 (June, 1947); Com-
ment, 57 YALE L.J. 788, 805 (1948).
68. See notes 54 and 55 supra.
69. For comments and references upon the distribution of investment expenditures re-
sulting from tax exemption of public securities, see LuTz, THE FIScAL AND EcONoMIc
ASPECTS OF THE TAXATION OF PUBLIC SECURITIES 119, 148-57 (1939) ; POWELL, NATIONAL
TAXATION OF STATE INSTRUMENTALITIES 59, 62 (1936) ; Schultz, Tax Exemption of Gov-
ernwental Securities, 17 TAXES 331, 332 (1939).
70. INT. REV. CODE §§ 13, 15.
71. The proportion of annual national income represented by corporate profits before
tax since 1940, for example, has amounted to only 10-15 percent of personal income (the
sum of wage and salary receipts, proprietary and rental income, interest, dividends and
transfer payments). See UNITED STATES DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SURVEy oF CU"ENT
BUSINESS 19 (Tables 1, 3) (National Income Supp. July, 1947).
72. See note 49 supra.
73. See Shultz, Economic Effects of A Corporate Income Tax, 21 TAXES 598 (1943).
74. Id. at 629.
75. Present law permits carry-back and -over of business net operating losses for
two years each and carry-forward of net capital losses for five years. INT. REV. CODE
§ 117(e) (1), 122 (b) (3). For recommendations of longer periods contributing to the
attractiveness of risk-taking and to cyclical business stability, see GROVES, PRODUCTION,
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ules76 exert a general effect on total investment much the same as cognate
provisions in computing the personal income tax. And the mere existence
of a corporate income tax in theory operates to some degree to direct invest-
ment into non-corporate forms.7 7 In addition, permitting interest, but not
dividends, as a business deduction,7 for instance, tends to induce heavy cor-
porate bond issues. The accrual of fixed interest charges on these bonds dur-
ing recessional periods, according to many observers, contributes to the bank-
ruptcies and reorganization which may well exert an adverse influence on pro-
duction.
79
Advocates of recent tax proposals usually frame amendments to the Internal
Revenue Code in terms of the effect of such amendments on either consump-
tion or investment. Those favoring the encouragement of consumption ex-
penditures generally seek to modify the rate or exemption on lower income
groups. And pro-investment suggestions follow a similar, but rather more
elaborate, pattern for the higher income groups-offering numerous special
provisions designed to reduce the "confiscatory" or "prohibitive" tax burden
on selected classes of savers who provide the funds for investment expendi-
Jos AND T.AxEs 58 (1944); Domar and Musgrave, Income Taxation and Rish Taling,
23 Tx.-&s 60 (1945).
76. Depreciation, including obsolescence, is now allowed only to the extent of a "rea-
sonable" amount for "exhaustion, wear, and tear" of an asset. INT. Rnv. CoDo §23(1).
Liberalized permission to businesses to shorten the depreciable life of assets, thus decreas-
ing the accounting profits and the size of income tax payments and encouraging rapid
replacements of fixed equipment fully depreciated for tax purposes, has been advanced as
a stimulus to investment expenditures. See GaovEs, PRODUcTioN, JOBS A.D TAxs 62
(1946); Musgrave, Federal Tax Reform in BO.uM OF Goan'oRs OF Tilm FEMnALx IE-
sErv SYsTmI, PUBLIC FNANCE AND FuLL EmrLoyr xT 22, 40 (Postwar Economic
Studies No. 3, 1945) ; Seghers, Accelerated Depreciation, 25 TAx.S 645 (1947).
77. Because of its own progressive rates plus the added burden of a personal income
tax on dividends distributed by a corporation, the federal tax on corporate income is
dearly higher than the tax on income of unincorporated enterprise of analogous size.
However, it is unlikely today, except perhaps in the cases of small enterprises, that the
corporate tax per se is a significant incentive for transforming corporations into partner-
ships or other forms of unincorporated business organization. For use of the corporate
form of business permits accumulation of earnings and avoidance of high surtax rates
applicable to the earnings of unincorporated business. See notes 54, 55 and 57 supra.
And other non-tax considerations, such as limited liability and absentee ownership, out-
weigh the tax disadvantage of the corporation. See Shultz, Economic Effects of a Corp.o-
rate Income Tax, 21 TAXES 598, 600-01 (1943) ; cf. Bock, Taxation Tre,:ds from the Man-
agenent Standpoint, 23 TA.xEs 1064 (1945) (noting some dissolutions of corporations in
favor of partnerships in the past, but a reversal of trend in more recent years). Compare
the similar effect upon the relative incentive to invest in corporate and government enter-
prise, note 69 supra.
78. IxTr. REv. CoDE § 23 (b).
79. See GRovs, PRODUCTION, JOBS AND TAXEs 25, 26 (1944); HA -s, Ecox.ormic
PROBLEmS- OF THE PosT-VAR WORLD 41 (1942) ; Goldenweiser, s.rnDa note 7, at 9; Levin-
son, The Integration of Taxes on Income, 25 TAXEs 404, 405-6 (1947); Rura, Fiscal
Policy and the Taxation of Business, 1 TAx L. REv. 75, 81 (1945) ; Simons, Federal Tax
Reform, 14 U. OF CL L. R-v. 20, 63-5 (1946).
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tures.80 Thus, a proposal to revise the basis of income tax computation by
averaging erratic individual incomes over a series of fiscal years 8' may be ra-
tionalized as a device to shift investment to less conservative capital outlets.
Similarly, exemptions or lower rates for small and youthful corporations have
been urged as stimulants of new risk enterprise.82
ADMINISTRATION OF A COUNTERCYCLICAL TAX PROGRAM
Even though many proponents of federal tax revision have recognized the
economic utility of taxation, specific plans have been too short in range to
provide countercyclical control. For in the main these proposals have been
directed toward the mere attainment of maximum peacetime production, em-
ployment and purchasing power. It is clear, however, in view of the con-
stantly changing economic forces other than taxation, that any permanent re-
vision of the income tax or rate cannot maintain equilibrium among consump-
tion, investment and savings once a desirable ratio is struck. Deliberate use
80. Suggested' tax programs vary in degree respecting the incentive to consumption
and investment expenditures. For vigorous pro-consumption plans, see RUML AND SONNE,
FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICY (1944) (National Planning Association) ; National Law-
yers Guild, Committee on Taxation, Federal Fiscal Policy, 6 LAW. GUILD REV. 511 (1946) ;
Ruttenberg, 6 The American Forum of the Air (Nov. 14, 1944) (Research Director,
United Steelworkers of America). For equally vigorous pro-investment plans, see KIm-
F.riz, POSTVAR TAX POLICY AND BusINEss EXPANSION (1943) (Brookings Institution) ;
MAGILL, THE PosT WAR FEDERAL TAX SYsTEM (1943) (Tax Foundation); TWIN
CITIES RESEARCH BURAU, THE TWIN CITIES PLAN FOR POSTWAR TAXATION (1944);
Craven, A Survey of Post-War Tax Plans, 25 TRusT BULL. 14 (1945) ; Lutz, A Post-
War Tax Program, Commercial and Financial Chronicle, Feb. 10, 1944, § 1, p. 593,
col. 2-3; National Association of Manufacturers' Program for Federal Tax Revision, 93
Cong. Rec. A3667-75 (July 11, 1947) ; Nelson, Post-War System of Taxes Proposed and
Post-War Tax Plan and Risk Capital, N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 1944, § 5, p. 1, col, 8; id., Aug.
13, 1944, § 5, p. 1, col. 4.
For excellent objective compilations of possible tax changes influencing both com-
ponents of national spending, see Musgrave, Federal Tax Reform, in BOARD or GOVERNORS
OF THE FEDERAL REsER E SYSTEM, PUBLIC FINANCE AND FULL EMPLOYMENT 25 el scq.
(Postwar Economic Studies No. 3, 1945); Studenski, Tax Program for Post-War, 80
TRUSTS & ESTATES 15 (1945).
81. An unavoidable objection to the averaging device seems to be administrative diffi-
culty involved in refunding overpayments. Also, since the base for an average must be
fixed in the first year of payment, the taxpayer is often required to pay on a basis that
later becomes unrepresentative of his income. See GROVES, PRODUCTION, JoBs AND TAxES
84, 85 (1944) ; Musgrave, Federal Tax Reform in BOARD OF GovRNoas or TlE FEnRAL
RESERVE SYSTEM, PUBLIC FINANCE AND FULL EMPLOYMENT 22, 34 (Postwar Economic
Studies No. 3, 1945).
82. See HANSEN, ECONOMIC POLICY AND FULL EMPLOYMENT 144 (1947); KimmEL,
op. cit. supra note 80, at 17; Goldenweiser, supra note 7, at 9; Musgrave, Federal Tax
Reform in BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, PUBLIC FINANCE AND
FULL E MPLOYMENT 22, 36-7 (Postwar Economic Studies No. 3, 1945) ; National Lawyers
Guild, Committee on Taxation, snpra note 80. Safeguards would have to be provided
under this proposal against splitting up of corporations to make use of multiple exemp-
tions.
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of this levy to implement the Employment Act of 1940 must presume flex-
ibility at least in its rate and bases3-the elements which influence current na-
tional spending and subsequent national income most ascertainably. More-
over, the wide divergence of consumption and investment philosophies espoused
in postwar tax programs points up the necessity for administration of a flex-
ible tax system by an authority divorced from private interests and currently
informed on national production, income and spending.
Congress is the constitutionally appointed tax authority. Two features in
the existing legislative process, however, militate strongly against direct Con-
gressional supervision of a countercyclical tax program. First, before revenue
legislation reaches statutory form today, it must undergo seriatim the advice
of the Treasury Department, the President, the Ways and Means Committee
of the House of Representatives, the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue
Taxation of both houses, the Committee of the Whole House, the House, the
Committee on Finance of the Senate, the Senate and the President again.l
The prolonged time interval involved in such parliamentary procedure may
well defeat a program in which speed is fundamental.8 5 Second, even with
the facilities of committee hearings and debates over pending tax bills, Con-
gressmen with manifold duties of office cannot be expected to qualify as well
as economic technicians in recognizing the symptoms of maladjustments in the
flow of national income through the various institutions which may effectively
narrow or enlarge it and in ordering appropriate compensatory relief.
Two substitutes may be suggested for avoiding the inexpediencies of present
Congressional procedure. By the first, Congress could delegate a part of its
tax power, the power to amend the income tax rate or base within fixed limits,
to an administrative authority equipped with economic analysts and statis-
tical fact-finding personnel."6 Or, alternatively, Congress could retain the
83. Senator Morse recently presaged the need for flexibility in the tax structure in
amendments to H.R. 3950, which were rejected by the Senate. See 93 CoN:G. Rc. 8679,
8762, 8770 (1947). For other recommendations of a flexible tax policy, see HA=;ssN, Eco-
N omc PoIrcY A.ND FULL EmPLOYiMENT 140-2 (1947); HANSEN AND Pu.LOFF, SrTAx AND
LocAL FINANCE IN THE NATIONAL EcoNomy 255-6 (1944) ; Goldenweiser, supra note 7,
at 14.
Flexibility should be confined within the limits of a basic tax structure of relatively
stable rates and base in order to create confidence in businessmen for planning without
the risk of sharp reversals in government tax policy. See Gcovs, PosTvAR TA.xATio;
A.xD EcoNomic PROGRESS 12, 361 (1946) ; HANSEN, EcoNomisc Pxonsxs OF THE POST-
wAR WOLDa 43 (1942).
84. FASSETT, SUMMARY OF PROCEDURE IN PREPARATION, CO.swDERATI0Io, AND Armp-
TION OF THE FEDERAL BUDGET, AND THE METHOD AND SEQUENCE Ii. THE ENACTMENT OF
REVENUE LEGISLATION 12-3 (1940). In major tax legislation enacted between 1926-1946,
as many as 3 months elapsed before many bills became law after being passed by the
House of Representatives. See 93 CONG. REc. 5599-5600 (1947).
85. See GRovFs, PosrVAR T..xATION A D EcoNomic PnoGREss 360 (1946).
86. "Immense power, of course, resides in the employment of taxation avowedly for
social ends. Normally, however, it suffers from an inability to provide flexibility of treat-
ment and continuity of concern with given segments of our industrial civilization-at-
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taxing power but modify the income tax rate or base by some abbreviated pro-
cedure7 upon the recommendation of an advisory group of economists. Both
methods possess the advantages of circumventing time lags fatal to the purpose
of remedial tax measures and of affording economically sounder tax action.
Although a degree of error in prediction of consequences would certainly ob-
tain even in the recommendations of economists, mistakes would be readily cor-
rectible because of the "trial and error" permitted by flexible tax administra-
tion.
A delegated tax authority finds analogy in the Federal Reserve Act 8s and the
Trade Agreements Act of 1934.89 Since 1913, the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System has occupied a kindred supervisory position in the
field of banking. Through its power to influence the extension of credit by the
banking system,90 the Board of Governors controls to a considerable extent the
national spending process and thus seeks to minimize inflationary or reces-
sional business trends.01 And, similarly, Congress has empowered the Presi-
dent, assisted by the fact-finding and recommendations of the Tariff Commis-
tributes that characterize the administrative process." LANDIS, TnE AaDmISiTRATIV9
PROCESS 119-20 (1938).
Various forms for an administrative tax authority have been suggested: GROVES,
POSTWAR TAXATION AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS 360 (1946) (undefined "administrative
agency") ; HANSEN, EcoNomic POLICY AND FULL EMPLOYMENT 141 (1947) (the Pres-
ident); PAUL, TAXATION FOR PROSPERITY 397-8 (1947) (Treas. Dep't) ; Colni, Tax
Policy and Capital Formation in NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE BOARD, CAPITAL
FORMATION AND ITS ELEMENTS 73, 83 (1939) ("executive arm of the Government");
Graske, supra note 8, at 206 (board of advisory tax experts) ; Lutz, Tax Sigplification,
22 TAXES 251 (1944) (Joint Congressional Committee assisted by advisory council of
experts) ; Musgrave, Federal Tax Refo rm, in BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FmERD. RE-
SERVE SYSTEM, PUBLIC FINANCE AND FULL EMPLOYMENT 22, 43 (.Postwar Economic
Studies No. 3, 1945) (representatives of both legislative and executive branches).
87. See p. 1258 infra.
88. 38 STAT. 251-75 (1913), as amended, 12 U.S.C. §§ 221-522 (1940).
89. 48 STAT. 943 (1934), 19 U.S.C. § 1351 (1940), as amended, 59 STAT. 410 (1945),
19 U.S.C. § 1351 (Supp. 1946).
90. See, e.g., the power of the Board of Governors to define paper discountable by
Federal Reserve Banks, 38 STAT. 263 (1913), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 343 (1940); to
review discount rates for that paper, 38 STAT. 264 (1913), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 357
(1940); to set member bank reserve requirements, 38 STAT. 270 (1913), as amended, 12
U.S.C. §462(b) (1940); and to authorize Federal Reserve Banks to engage in open
market security transactions, 38 STAT. 264 (1913), as amended, 12 U.S.C. §§353, 355
(1940). See also Raichle v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 34 F.2d 910, 914
(C.C.A. 2d 1929) (declaring valid the activities of a Federal Reserve Bank engaging
in open market transactions, the statutory provision for fixing discount rates being recog-
nized as constitutional without question) ; BOARD OF GOVEiNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERvE
SYSTEM, THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTE-M-ITS PURPOSES AND FuNcTIoNS c. v (1939).
91. The Board of Governors has declared that the objective of Federal Reserve policy
is "to maintain monetary conditions favorable for an active and sound use of the country's
productive facilities, full employment, and a rate of consumption reflecting widely diffused
well-being." BOARD OF GovERxoRs OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTFM, op. cit. supra note 90,
at 115.
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sion,9 2 to modify import-export duties93 for the purpose of expanding foreign
markets for American products. In language resembling the policy declaration
of the Employment Act of 1946, this delegation of tariff regulation was in-
tended, inter alia, to help "in overcoming domestic unemployment and the pres-
ent economic depression, [and] in increasing the purchasing power of the
American public.'*4
Despite these analogies, however, delegation of the power to tax raises an
important question of constitutionality and an even more serious problem of
practicability.
Although the present judiciary is accustomed to administrative delegation,05
definitive standards must still be established governing the area of administra-
tive action.96 It would seem advisable in order to avoid constitutional hazards,
92. The Tariff Commission is charged by statute with the investigation of the "fiscal
and industrial effects of the customs laws of this country" for the information of the Presi-
dent, the House Ways and Means Committee, and the Senate Committee on Finance. 46
STAT. 698 (1930), 19 U.S.C. § 1332 (1940). Its power is solely that of a fact-finding ad-
visory body. See 34 Ors. ATr'y GE. 77, 79 (1924). Yet, investigation by the Commission
is a condition precedent to the issuance of a valid Presidential proclamation altering the
tariff. See Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States, 20 C.C.P.A. (Cust.) 27,
34 (1932), aff'd, 288 U.S. 294 (1933) ; United States v. Fox River Butter Co., 20 C.C.P.A.
(Cust.) 38, 45 (1932), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 628 (1932).
93. The Trade Agreements Act of 1934 today permits the President by proclamation
to decrease or increase up to 50% any duty rate in effect on January 1, 1945. 48 STAT. 943
(1934), 19 U.S.C. § 1351 (1940), as amended, 59 ST.w. 410 (1945), 19 U.S.C.A. § 1351
(Supp. 1946). See also the Tariff Act of 1930, conferring similar power upon the Presi-
dent to change the duty rate to equalize costs of production of foreign articles with the
American selling price. 46 STAT. 701 (1930), 19 U.S.C. § 1336(c) (1940).
94. 48 STAT. 943 (1934), 19 U.S.C. § 1351 (1940).
95. It has long been recognized that limited legislative functions may be delegated to
an administrative body despite objections based upon the related constitutional doctrines of
separation of powers and due process of law. The argument against delegation rests upon
the assumption that the Constitution requires a rigid division of power among the legisla-
tive, executive and judicial branches of the government. Because an executive agency is
without power to perform legislative functions, the taking of liberty or property through
the exercise of powers constitutionally reserved to the legislature is said to be a depriva-
tion of due process of law. See Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 405-6
(1928); Buttfield v. Stranaham, 192 U.S. 470, 491-2 (1904); BLac.U 4LND OT.AN',
ADinISTRA=E LEGISLATION AND ADuDicATO.N 72-3 (1934). Where the courts have
found it necessary to answer this argument in sustaining delegations, they have either
declared the duties of the agency "quasi-legislative" in character or abandoned the
doctrine of separation of powers and substituted instead a theory of checks and balances.
See, e.g., Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 119-20 (1925) ; BLAcHLY AND OATMA , Op. Cit.
supra, at 73-4; ComER, LEGISLATrvE FuNcTIoNs or NATIONAL ADnisNisTATv ALmTuou-
TIES 114-7 (1927) ; LAimis, THE ADMMNISTRATIVE PROCESS 1-2 (1938); PZ:iNcc1:, AD-
INIrsTRATION AND THE RULE OF LAW 19 (1941) ; Cheadle, The Dclcgalion of Lcgislative
Functions, 27 YALE L.J. 892 (1918); Green, Separation of Governamcntal Poters; 29
YALE L.J. 369 (1920).
96. Some standard for guiding the delegated body must, of course, be provided to indi-
cate the bounds of administrative discretion. Underlying the Constitutional basis for the
need of such administrative standards seems to be the theory that Congress may not dele-
gate its functions without qualification because of the provision in Art. I, § 1, that "[a]ll
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therefore, not only that Congress enunciate the economic policy behind a par-
tial delegation of tax direction, but also that such delegation be confined to
specified variations in the income tax rate or base. And the issuance of these
changes perhaps would need to be based upon specific conditions, such as, for
example, the departure of national production and employment from some
fixed high norm. On the basis of repeated decisions upholding other Congres-
sional delegations,9 with few exceptions no longer controlling,"8 the Supreme
legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress... ." See Panama Refin-
ing Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421 et seq. (1935). Although the question of how definite
a standard the Constitution requires has been before the courts in numerous cases and con-
texts, no general criterion has ever been agreed upon. For examples of formulas laid
down in decisions upholding delegations, see Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, supra
note 95, at 409 ("intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to fix ...
rates is directed to conform") ; Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 426 (1944) ("stan-
dards . . . sufficiently definite and precise to enable Congress, the courts and the public to
ascertain whether the Administrator . . . has conformed") ; American Power & Light
Co. v. S.E.C., 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946) (delineation of "the general policy, the public
agency which is to apply it, and the boundaries of this delegated authority").
97. See, e.g., Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947) (authority of Federal Home
Loan Bank Board to prescribe terms and condition for appointment of conservators of fed-
eral savings and loan associations, no statutory standard being given) ; Yakus v. United
States, supra note 96 (authority of Price Administrator to control wartime prices) ; Fed-
eral Radio Commission v. Nelson Bro. Bond & Mtg. Co., 289 U.S. 266 (1933) (authority
of Radio Commission to make "fair and equitable allocation" of broadcasting privileges on
the basis of "public convenience, interest or necessity") ; Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32
(1924) (authority of Secretary of Labor to deport "undesirable residents of the United
States") ; United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911) (authority of Secretary of the
Interior to make rules "to insure the objects" of public forest reservations) ; Buttfield v.
Stranahan, supra note 95 (authority of Secretary of Treasury to "establish uniform stand-
ards of purity, quality and fitness for consumption of all kinds of tea imported into the
United States").
For discussions of these and other statutory delegations which have been held consti-
tutional, see CUSHMAN, THE INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMxISSIONS 423 ct seq. (1941) ;
DICKINSON, DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER In AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(Address) (1935) ; Aiken, The Nature and Exercise of Legislative Power: A Phase of
the American Doctrine of the Separation of Powers, 26 GEO. L. J. 606 (1938) ; Feller,
Prospectus for the Further Study of Federal Administrative Law, 47 YALE L, J. 647
(1938) ; Jaffe, An Essay on Delegation of Legislative Power: 1, 11, 47 CoL. L. REv. 359,
561 (1947) ; Smith, Administrative Law: A Threat to Constitutional Government?, 31 VA.
L. REv. 1 (1944) ; Note, 18 NOTRE DAME LAW. 338 (1943).
98. Attempted delegation to the President under the National Industrial Recovery Act
of power to impose "codes of fair competition" upon business and to prohibit interstate
shipments of oil in excess of the amounts permitted by state authority was held unconsti-
tutional because of Congressional failure to prescribe adequate standards for the guidance
of the Executive. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, supra note 96.
However, when the Supreme Court upheld the power of the Price Administrator to
"stabilize prices and to prevent speculative, unwarranted, and abnormal increases in prices
and rents," with no more definite standard for its discretion than consideration "so far as
practicable" for prices prevailing between October 1-15, 1941, it seems permanently to
have shed whatever non-delegable inhibitions were once in vogue. See Roberts, J., dissent-
ing in Yakus v. United States, supra note 96, at 452: "Comparison of [the standards pre-
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Court could find in a delegation so qualified a sufficient standardization of ad-
ministrative discretion."
But, even though delegation of other Congressional powers may be sustain-
able upon this basis, the power to tax may not be delegable at all. Several state
courts, at least, for one reason or another, have declared invalid attempted
delegations of the taxing power.'00 While there are exceptions-for example,
the power may usually be given to municipal corporations' 0 1 -this proposition
must be accepted as prevailing judicial opinion and may be expected to obtain
among legislators as well.
Perhaps this reluctance to permit the determination of tax rates by adminis-
trative bodies may be explained as the result of an identification of attitudes
towards administrative tax direction with the historical fear of "taxation with-
out representation."' 1 2 And it seems doubtful that the Fathers would have
sanctioned this practice in drafting the Federal Constitution, which has, in
turn, provided the model for many state constitutions. Yet it is not clear in
just what respect a partial delegation of the taxing power would result in un-
represented taxation as long as Congress exercised continuing control over the
administrative taxing authority.10 3
scribed in the National Industrial Recovery Act] . . .with those of the present [Emer-
gency Price Control] Act... leaves no doubt that the [Schechter] decision is now over-
ruled." See also Jaffe, An Essay on Delegation of Legislative Power: II, 47 CoL L. REv.
561, 581 (1947) ("Undoubtedly it can be argued that realistically considered Schechter has
been put in the museum of constitutional history.").
99. Procedural due process would not be an obstacle to administrative tax direction.
For, under a rule developed in cases involving ,state and local taxing bodies, taxpayers are
not constitutionally entitled to notice and hearing before a tax becomes effective. Bi-
Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of Equalization of Colorado, 239 U.S. 441 (1915) ;
Kentucky Railroad Tax Cases, 115 U.S. 321, 331 (1885). See also 1 CcoLnv, Tun LA,
OF TAXATION § 145 (4th ed. 1924). And judicial review before the exercise of the taxing
power has consistently been held unnecessary to due process as long as there is opportunity
for subsequent judicial determination of taxpayers' rights which may be infringed by illegal
administrative action. Phillips v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 283 U.S. 589, 595-7
(1931).
For discussion of the practical wisdom in these constitutional principles as applied to
the tax function of the government, see Dicxz-sox, ADurNnmS~ TivE JtsrncE A D Tan Su-
PREmAcy OF LAW IN =an UNITED STATS 270-2 (19.27); McDermott, To What Extert
Should the Decisions of Administrative Bodies Be Reziewable by the Courts?, 25 A.B.A.J.
453, 456, 458 (1939).
100. Wilson v. Philadelphia School District, 323 Pa. 225, 195 A. 90 (1937), 51 H,%nv.
L. Rrxv. 548 (1938). For collections of cases, see 1 COOLEY, op. cit. supra note 99, at § 74;
Gau.nomu, AD-INISTRATIVE LAW CASES AND CODMaEmnS 170 (2d ed. 1947).
101. Henderson Bridge Co. v. Henderson City, 173 U.S. 592 (1899). See also 1
Cooixy, op. cit. supra note 99, at § 75; GELLEORN, op. cit. supra note 100, at 10-2; 6 Mc-
QUILLIn, THE LAW OF MfuNICnAL CorponTxroNs § 2520 (2d ed. 1928).
102. See, e.g., Harward v. St. Clair and Munroe Levee and Drainage Co., 51 Ill. 130,
135 (1869), in which an attempted delegation of the power to levy a property tax to a
drainage district corporation was denied as violative of that "which our forefathers thought
just cause of revolution'
103. To insure control by providing a general safeguard against possible arbitrary ac-
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A more tangible explanation of the non-delegability view can be found in the
specific constitutional provision that all federal revenue measures shall origi-
nate in the House of Representatives.'" This limitation would suggest that,
even though other Congressional duties may be assumed by appointed officials,
the power to tax may have been intentionally reserved to members of the only
elective legislative group existing when the Constitution was written.10 5 To
this explanation also, however, the judicially-approved power of the President
to alter tariff rates' 0 -- another form of revenue measure-furnishes recent
coutervailing precedent. 1' 7
By tradition, nevertheless, politics seems to be considered as an essen-
tial safeguard against arbitrary taxation. And any administrative taxing au-
thority is at least one step removed from political restraints. Taking taxation
directly out of the hands of legislators, moreover, would put an end to the
favorite platform of tax reduction employed for generations by campaigning
politicians. Accordingly, it is unlikely that any attempt to remove taxation
from Congress, though only to the minimal extent desirable in executing the
national economic policy, could be successful.
It would seem more soundly considered, therefore, to adapt the existing
process of Congressional tax legislation to economic needs. A basis for adapta-
tion has already been provided in the very Employment Act of 1946. From the
President's Council of Economic Advisers'"8 or a similar group of experts ap-
pointed solely to advise the Congress, current information of national economic
conditions and explicit recommendations for tax action could be secured. In-
stead of relaying these recommendations through normal Congressional chan-
tion the finality of an administrative tax order might be deferred until a lapse of some
reasonably short time period, such as 30 days, after issuance without Congressional disap-
proval. For the use of this procedural device in other administrative contexts, see Section
4(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 60 STAT. 239 (1946), 5 U.S.C.A. § 1003(c)
(Supp. 1947); FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S ComMiTTEE ON ADMINISTRA-
TIVE PROCEDURE 114-5 (1941).
104. U. S. CoNsT., Art. 1, § 7.
105. The Senate did not become a popularly elected body until 1913. U. S. CoNgT.
AMEND. XVII.
106. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, pepra note 95; United States v. Fox River
Butter Co., supra note 92. See also Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States,
288 U.S. 294, 305 (1933).
107. See the answer of Chief justice Taft to the argument that enforcement of Con-
gressional policy by executive regulation has never been permitted in the levying of taxes
and customs duties: "The authorities make no such distinction. The same principle that
permits Congress to exercise its rate making power in interstate commerce, by declaring
the rule which shall prevail in the legislative fixing of rates, and enables it to remit to a
rate-making body created in accordance with its provisions the fixing of such rates, justifies
a similar provision for the fixing of customs duties ... " Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United
States, supra note 95, at 409.
108. Members of the Council must be "exceptionally qualified to analyze and interpret
economic developments . . . and to formulate and recommend national economic policy to
promote employment, production, and purchasing power under free competitive enterprise."
60 STAT. 24 (1946), 15 U.S.C.A. § 1023 (Supp. 1947).
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nels, this advisory council could submit them to the Congressional Joint Com-
mittee of the Economic Report,0 9 also established under the Act. Finally, the
Committee could initiate in both houses simultaneously a joint resolution em-
bracing the acceptable recommendations of the council. Frequently used for a
mere expression of Congressional opinion, the joint resolution, capable of rela-
tively quick enactment, would be a more appropriate vehicle for effectuating
economic tax changes than the ordinary statute, even though it would still have
to be approved by the President."'
If a joint tax resolution were utilized only to change the rate or base of the
income tax within defined limits, virtually the same result as independent ad-
ministrative tax direction could be accomplished. Changes in the tax system
principally qualitative in their effect upon national spending would be left to
regular Congressional procedure. Time-consuming debate and the resolution
of conflicting political issues would be reserved for consideration of the more
basic and permanent changes in the tax structure. The more expeditious and
less protracted procedure characteristic of the joint resolution would be pro-
tected to this extent from gradual disintegration under the pressure of diversely
interested taxpayers. And the goal of a flexible countercyclical tax administra-
tion could be more nearly realized.
CONCLUSION
Flexible tax administration provides one ready means of furthering the ob-
jectives of the Employment Act of 1946. Through variations in taxes, private
consumption expenditures can be influenced toward the level requisite to maxi-
mum national product, income and employment without depriving consumers
of freedom of choice in their expenditures. In like manner, taxes can be used
to promote the desirable level of private investment expenditures in relation to
savings without direct government intervention in private business manage-
ment. If government fails to stabilize national income through fiscal policy-
the use of taxes, banking policy and its arsenal of weapons for controlling the
size and flow of national income-drastic public regulation of another type
may well become a reality. The alternative, under the pressure of either defla-
tion or inflation in the extreme, would be direct control of wages, prices and al-
locations, in a pattern of planning which would have totally different social and
political consequence."'
109. This Committee, established by the Employment Act of 1946, is now charged with
the continuous study of information concerning the President's Economic Report and with
the duty to make recommendations to Congress upon all suggestions contained in the Re-
port. 60 STAT. 25 (1946), as amended, 60 STAT. 838 (1946), 15 U.S.C.A. § 1024 (Supp.
1947).
110. See 6 Ops. ATT'v Gm. 6S0 (1854).
111. Recently, a well-informed critique of the steadily cumulative inflationary move-
ments on all fronts of the 1948 domestic economy has been made by Leon Keyserling, vice-
chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers. Mr. Keyserling emphasizes the urgent
need for harmonizing fiscal policy and all other devices of government economic regula-
tion with a "national prosperity budget" in order to avoid the "boom-bust" cycle of the
past. The Economic Test: Will We Act in Timne?, N.Y. Times, June 13, 1948, § 6, p. 7.
